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Introduction
The objective of sustainable and longterm development satisfying the needs of the present generation while not depriving future generations of the opportunity to meet their needs [UN General Assembly, 1987, p. 24] was announced for the first time in the World Com mission on Environment and Development (WCED) report "Our Common Future." This report was revolutionary for its time, and has of course differently affected the scope of resource exploitation, directions of technical development and structural changes in the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The pressing need for all BRICS members to improve the quality of their people's lives and to overcome develop ment gaps through economic growth has not always been coordinated with their environ mental capabilities; hence, the burden on natural resources is one of the common points in the national development strategies of the BRICS states.
A common problem for the BRICS in terms of the quality of development is also that, in the words of the WCED report, "a world in which poverty is endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes" [UN General Assembly, 1987, pp. 24, 143] . According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), despite significant progress in combating poverty in all BRICS countries, stratification of their societies remains high. The maximum Gini coefficient for OECD countries at 0.5 [OECD, 2015, p. 20 ] is average for the BRICS.
2 Despite the absolute importance of eco nomic growth for the eradication of poverty in developing countries, given the current in come distribution, growth in the BRICS may not affect most households' incomes due to restrictions on the gross domestic product (GDP) redistribution channels and low elasticity of links between poverty and inequality, and also between poverty and income [Fosu, 2010, pp. 16-27] . While the expansion of BRICS economies has for a long time determined the increase in the population's income mainly through budgetary channels [Lustig, 2015] , the redistribution of incomes from foreign trade accompanied by the BRICS' integration into global economic ties and structural shifts in the private sector often act as stressors for social stability [OECD, 2014, pp. 68-71] .
The progress in trade and investment relations within the BRICS, initially embod ied in expanding mutual exports (on average its aggregate volume multiplied through out 2009-2014 relative to 2009), 3 and then in the importance of their local markets as complementing (for China and India) or replenishing (for Brazil and Russia) the com pression of external demand in 2013-2016, can serve the purposes of further growth in the BRICS. At the same time, the exponential fall in prices for energy resources and basic commodities in 2013-2016 affected the physical parameters of BRICS economies with kaleidoscopic speed, depending on export dependence and inclusion in global value chains, thereby determining the quality of the BRICS development models and giving impetus to redistribution of incomes from Brazilian, Russian and South African export ers to Indian and Chinese importers, as well as leading to instability of trade and invest ment within the BRICS.
This research focuses on the impact of multilateral cooperation mechanisms on na tional development strategies and their benchmarks, and the resulting BRICS dialogue aimed at sharing best practices and technologies for sustainable and balanced growth, tak ing into account the most demonstrative achievements of their economic engagement in the trade area.
The Global Contours of the BrICS' Dialogue on Sustainable Development
The dynamic development of the BRICS economies, which has no analogues in terms of pace -even taking into account the negative growth of Brazil and Russia in 2013-2016 , the average annual GDP growth rates in the BRICS were almost four times higher than in the Group of 7 (G7) in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] 5 -and which has brought their share in the global economy closer to that of developed countries, 6 has been inevitably accompanied by profound chang es in all spheres of natural resources exploitation and human activity.
The adjustment of BRICS development models to environmentally friendly growth aimed at reducing poverty and facilitating the wellbeing of present and future generations (see Table 1 ) occurred in different environments and at different paces. In Brazil, India and South Africa with complex, multilayered and fragmented social structures, distinctive society polarization, and economic inequality, such an adjustment was impossible with out broad political and economic transformations. The turn to inclusive growth in Bra zil was gaining strength in President Lula da Silva's "humanoriented" modernization of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , accompanied by the combination of economic liberalism with social reforms [Okuneva, 2008, pp. 753-68] . During that period, Brazil managed to halve extreme po verty (the poverty rate based on the purchasing power power (PPP) threshold of $1.25 a day decreased from 4.2% to 2.1%) 7 and the absolute numbers of chronically undernourished people have also declined [FAO, 2014b] .
In India and South Africa, the enclave type of development has for a long time re strained the quality of economic growth: after 11 fiveyear national development plans aimed at eliminating poverty ("propoor growth"), by the end of 2012 the poverty rate in India was lowered by almost 20% while the gap between the layers of society continued to broaden (the Gini coefficient continued to grow until 2015) [UNDP, n.d.] . 8 As of today, onethird of India's population, as well as 41% of South Africans, continue to face greater restrictions and deprivations than people in other BRICS countries (see Multidimensional Poverty Index in Table 1 ). One in four urban and one in three rural inhabitants still live below the poverty line, and only 21% of those living in rural areas have access to basic sani tation [Anand et al., 2014, pp. 48-56] . According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, 31.4% of India's and 13.2% of South Africa's populations are chronically undernourished.
9 At the same time, Russia and China were the first BRICS countries to eliminate hunger. Reorientation of the development models to domestic demand in Rus sia and China is largely explained by the fiasco of the market in the distribution of growth benefits (inequality) and global challenges.
The 1987 WCED report also highlighted sustainable development policies such as human resources, food security, ecosystems, energy, industry and urbanization [United Nations General Assembly, 1987, pp. 27-34] , which became the guiding principles of the 5 Author's estimations based on IMF data [n.d.] . 6 At the end of 2014, the total BRICS purchasing power parity (PPP)based GDP equaled that of the G7, and taking into account the recession in 2013-2016 they together produced about 33% of the global GDP in 2016, while 39 countries from the IMF analytical group "Developed Economies" produced 40.6% (calculated by the author based on data from the IMF [n.d.] final declaration of the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop ment (The Earth Summit) in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro [UN, 1992b] . In turn, the Earth Summit Rio Declaration for the first time outlined the anthropocentric nature of sustain able development (principles 1, 10, 11 [UN, 1992a] ), pointing out that trade policy meas ures taken for environmental protection can serve as a means of discrimination and hid den protectionism, and therefore the approach that "the polluter should… bear the costs… without distorting international trade and investment" was agreed upon (principles 12, 16 [UN, 1992a] ). For developing BRICS countries, the principle of common but differentiated respon sibilities for global environmental degradation [UN, 1992a] manifested in the Rio Declara tion has become both unifying and divergent. Being the two largest greenhouse gas emitters of the world, China and India have repeatedly stressed that, despite their rapid industrial growth, their per capita emissions are lower than those in advanced countries and they need economic growth to address social and economic development problems At the next United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development "Rio+10" in 2002 in Johannesburg, special attention was paid to social aspects of sustainable development, with practical guidelines in this area formulated in the Rio de Janeiro Agenda 21 and the UN Millennium Declaration, and known as the millennium development goals (MDGs) [World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002] . The most acute MDGs for BRICS countries at the time were: to provide all people with an opportunity to earn on a sustain able basis and to halve by 2015 the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day; to protect the vulnerable and halve the proportion of people without access to basic sanita tion; to integrate the principles of environmental sustainability into national strategies; to minimize industrial harm to human health and the environment; and to preserve and ra tionally use exhaustible natural resources. During that period, BRICS members and other developing countries established more than 300 publicprivate partnerships 10 with large companies, producer associations and nongovernmental organizations as part of the agenda for businesses inclusion into national strategies (see Table 2 ). At the same time, the first International Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey (18-22 March 2002) , where interna tional trade became a key issue for discussion both as a driver of economic growth and employment, and as an important external source of financing for development [United Nations, 2002, p. 9-12] .
For the first time, the issue of trade barriers and nontariff measures that limit ac cess for emerging economies (for example, to agricultural markets of developed countries) and lead to global trade imbalances was included in the resume of the declaration and linked to the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations agenda at a meeting in Doha. There, delegates proposed to expand access to agricultural markets through the principle of lessthanfull reciprocity in the framework of the exemptions for Article XXVIII of the GATT [UN General Assembly, 2001, pp. 3-6] . Thus, the relationship between WTO rules and countries' obligations under multilateral environmental agreements has clearly been reflected in the impact of environmental measures on access to markets [UN General As sembly, 2001, p. 10].
The contours of the initially fragmented dialogue on sustainable development issues between the BRICS states were shaped at the multilateral cooperation platforms of the UN and WTO system. The rapprochement of political and diplomatic positions of the mem bers clearly resulted from internal economic priorities, and therefore occurred primarily between China and Brazil, and between Brazil and India. The former pair united around increasing the effectiveness of official development assistance and partnership between do nor countries (consistency, coherence, accountability [UN, 2002, pp. 37, 55] ). The latter almost fully agreed on the priority of eradicating poverty, investing in social projects and infrastructure [UN, 2002, p. 73] . The Russian position 11 was to acknowledge national re sponsibility for the development process, and to consider external support not as a perma nent factor, but as a means of assistance [UN, 2002, p. 45] . Access to developed countries' markets for goods, services and capital has become a unifying issue for all BRICS members.
The same reasons resulted in the multivector and multiformat BRICS dialogue on the particularly sensitive climate change agenda. The Bali Roadmap and Action Plan with a list of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) was adopted at the United Nations Climate Change Conference on 15 December 2007. Similarly to the subsequent Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) agreements, it attempted to record voluntary commitments and actions by countries aimed at reducing emissions. Having directly participated in the develop ment of these documents, India and China announced that they do not associate themselves with the agreements, and thus can coordinate implementation of certain measures among themselves [UN, 2015, Article 7.2 para. (c)]. Russia made its participation conditional on the participation of the largest greenhouse gas emitters, China and the United States. Finally, BRICS representatives gathered for a separate preliminary meeting, where they nevertheless reached a consensus on the legally binding nature of the agreement.
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Since 2013, an informal BRICS advisory group has been working within the FAO, which is formalized by the BRICS leaders [BRICS Leaders, 2014, p. 36] . Following the UN conference in Copenhagen (2009), the BRICS has focused on the relationship be tween climate change and food security, the recognition of great importance of traditional knowledge and clean technologies, and the need to transfer best practices within the group [BRICS Leaders, 2015] .
Within the framework of expanded responsibilities, the governments participating in the UN conferences on sustainable development were invited to develop national sustain able development strategies and a system of specialized agencies. Brazil was the first among the BRICS countries to establish the Commission on Environment and Sustainable De velopment ( Additionally, BRICS countries have developed support programs and incentives for the transition to the "green economy" as integral parts of their national development strat egies (see Table 2 ). Renewable energy sources have become the focus of special "green" programmes of state support in Brazil (PROINFA (Table 2) ), India (National Mission for a Green India) and South Africa (Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Pro curement Programme). State support in China is aimed at controlling industrial pollution, promoting the rational use of water and land resources, energy and natural resources, and industrial waste management as part of the programme to combat climate change in Rus sia, India, China and South Africa (see Table 2 ).
The declaration of the 2012 Rio+20 conference entitled "The Future We Want" con tained the greatest number of practical recommendations and guidelines for sustainable development in history [UN General Assembly, 2012] -from the proclamation of a "green economy" as one of the means to achieve sustainable development and eradicate poverty to the adoption of action programme with a set of financial support measures and summit decisions. It also established the UN System Task Team on the post2015 UN develop ment agenda which managed the transition from the MDGs to the sustainable develop ment goals (SDGs). BRICS countries conduct active public consultations on all 17 SDG thematic areas 13 in the framework of international initiatives and national dialogue plat forms (see Table 2 ). Thus, aligning specific BRICS interests in the dialogue on sustainable development is based on socially oriented growth and environmentally friendly development goals, while the MDGs (now SDGs) and national commitments to mitigate and adapt to climate change shape its outer contour. Taking a shared responsibility within the framework of multilateral environmental agreements and trade rules, BRICS countries affect global consumption and production, and at the same time reflect a number of parameters of such obligations in the internal development programs.
BrICS' Intragroup Trade for Complementing National Interests in Sustainable Development Dialog
The deepening of trade and investment ties between BRICS countries, accompanied by the growing importance of their local export markets as complementing external demand (for China and India) and replenishing it (for Brazil and Russia), was initially based on their goods' complementarity under relatively weak intragroup competition [Khmelevskaya, 2015a] . This relates to Brazilian meat products in the Russian and South African markets, components for power equipment produced in China, and Russian electrical equipment and gas turbine engines in other BRICS countries.
It was in mutual trade (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) that the results of the initial stage of BRICS devel opment became clear -in terms of overall export growth, Russia and Brazil were second after China, expanding both their trade ties (extensive growth) and export mix (intensive growth) [Khmelevskaya, 2015a, p. 46] . The divergence of external shock effects in 2013-2017 primar ily emphasized the structural weaknesses of the BRICS states along with the differences in their foreign trade agendas -the retention of export positions or seeking import substitution, expansion or intensification of commodity flows. That is why more and more finetuning is needed now for the already established set of cooperation mechanisms and a "broadbased dialogue" within the BRICS, both through the involvement of interested people (and most importantly, representatives of professional associations) to address specific problems and through the implementation of "crosscutting" development projects.
In line with the priorities of each presidency and using the multilateral negotia tions format adopted in the WTO, the BRICS trade and economic cooperation agenda has been discussed since 2011 at the meetings of economic and trade ministers and the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues -since 2015, at the meetings of natural resources and ecology ministers, energy ministers, ministers of industry, and heads of BRICS competition authorities, and since 2016, at the meetings of labour and employ ment ministers and heads of customs authorities. In 2016, BRICS launched and tested a new publicprivate partnership tool -the BRICS Environmentally Sound Technology (BEST) Platform. At the same time, specialized working groups have appeared within the BRICS on competition issues research (2012), information and communications technol ogy (2016), ecommerce (2017), environment (2018) 14 and others. Real demands of civil society and practical proposals on the BRICS trade and in vestment agenda have been articulated by the BRICS Business Forum since 2010 and the BRICS Business Council since 2013, by the Civil Forum, the Parliamentary Forum and 14 The memorandum on the establishment of the group was agreed upon during the meeting of the BRICS environment ministers on 13-16 September in Goa, and the first fullscale meeting of the group was held on 17 May 2018 in Durban.
the BRICS Youth Summit since 2015, and by the BRICS Universities League, the BRICS Network University and the Women Parliamentarians' Forum since 2016. In 2018, the Fo rum for the Exchange of Technologies and Innovations for Small and Mediumsized En terprises and the Science, Technology and Innovation Women's Forum were established. Their activities are aligned with addressing the development of women's entrepreneurship and increasing productivity, and therefore, ultimately, with a need to reorient national de velopment models toward inclusive and balanced innovational growth, which is now im portant for all BRICS members.
Trade policy measures are among the main barriers to intraBRICS trade, business and investment [Khmelevskaya, 2015b, p. 106] , and in the raw materials sector all members have relatively similar general levels of tariffs. In turn, impeding the sale of goods at prices that do not yield sufficient profits and increasing the burden on environmental systems, trade barriers encourage countries to increase exports of depletable resources, preserving low productivity and constraining the update of fixed assets. Almost twofold growth of Russian exports to the BRICS (by 80% in [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] 15 explained by crude oil and petro leum products supplies (constituting about half of all exports to the BRICS in 2014). In the wake of the fall in energy prices in 2014-early 2015, China increased imports of crude oil from Russia and Brazil, becoming the secondlargest buyer of petroleum products from the latter country. Despite the overall decline in intraBRICS trade in 2013-2016, the Chinese share in India's foreign trade grew due to a multiple increase in Indian exports of oil distil lation products, copper and chemical products [Khmelevskaya, 2015a] .
The ability of countries to improve access to new and environmentally friendly goods, services and technologies through international trade and, as a result, to more effectively allocate limited natural resources, was recognized at the summits in Rio de Janeiro and Jo hannesburg. The failsafe support for multiple complex links between sustainable develop ment and international trade is the focus of many international institutions. For their part, they provide an international legal regime for about 200 multilateral environmental agree ments, with more than 20 using traderelated measures to limit damage to the environment and human health while achieving their goals [UNEP, IISD, 2005, pp. 14-8].
The 2015) , all of which directly define traderelated regulatory measures. Today, Russia is the only BRICS country that has not ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Paris on 12 December 2015 by 195 countries and containing commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to keep the tem perature rise within 2°C and limit temperature growth by 1.5°C [UN, 2015, p. 2] .
Realizing that the impact of trade on the environment depends on the complemen tarity of their objectives and their orientation towards mutual support, international trade and commodity organizations (the WTO, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organization (WCO), International Sugar Organization (ISO), the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), the International Organization of Vine and Wine (OIV), etc.) support the concept of sustainable development both in their fundamental multilateral agreements and in their arbitration practices and standards. For example, the longest and most complex trade disputes within the WTO were related to the environment: from protecting the sea turtle population from accidental catches by indus trial fisheries to protecting human health from risks caused by the use of asbestos or the storage of used tires. The history of using the WTO as a platform for protecting the "green interests" of BRICS national economies (except Russia, which joined the pretrial WTO trade disputes settlement mechanism only in 2012) began almost from the moment of its establishment. The first case considered by this mechanism was the dispute over reformu lated gasoline between Venezuela, Brazil and the United States. The decision on this case determined that the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) should not be interpreted in isolation from public international law [WTO, 1996] , and thus it served as a precedent for including the provisions of multilateral environmental agreements when interpreting the provisions of the international trade organizations law.
In a dispute between the European Union and Brazil about retreaded tires in 2005, Brazil justified the imposition of restrictions on tire imports (not applicable to Mercosur and Venezuela) by arguing that because of the reduced period of using such tires, they are causing greater damage to the environment [WTO, 2009] . The proceedings resonated wide ly with the public because for the first time nongovernmental environmental organizations of different levels (the Center for International Environmental Law, the Brazilian branch of the World Wildlife Fund and the Brazilian Forum for Environment and Development) joined and presented their independent expert opinions to the WTO. The reports of the then Brazilian Minister of the Environment Marina Silva (second by the number of votes in the first round of the presidential elections in Brazil in 2014) and the then "responsible of ficer" of the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs and current WTO DirectorGeneral Rob erto Azevedo, were often accompanied by vivid and emotionally colourful presentations. Additionally, for the first time the rules for promoting free and fair trade were applied from the standpoint of environmental protection and their correlation with it [Kadysheva, 2013] meanwhile Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay and China joined the WTO panel discussion on its side to show solidarity with Brazil in that point.
Given the absence of free trade agreements between the BRICS countries or their in tegration groupings, the WTO today is the only effective format for both bilateral and com prehensive dialogues on the trade aspects of sustainable development. In their joint summit declarations, BRICS leaders have also repeatedly reaffirmed the mandate of UNCTAD as an institution responsible for trade, investment, finance and technology issues in the con text of development [BRICS Leaders, 2014, p. 12] . All BRICS countries are members and participants of key WCO agreements in the field of customs affairs. They are also members of many commodity organizations (the International Organization for Standardization and others):
17 Russia and Brazil are members of the International Coffee Organization (ICO), Russia and India are members of the International Grain Council (IGC), and Brazil, Rus sia and India are members of the ICCO [Khmelevskaya, 2014] .
WTO rules and practice are primarily aimed at maintaining a critically important bal ance: on the one hand, the sovereign right of WTO members to use certain measures to protect their national interests is inviolable; on the other hand, it is necessary to ensure that WTO members do not abuse this right by using it to mask protectionist measures in the process of interpreting and applying exemptions provided for in Article XX, both general and those aimed at protecting people's lives, their health and the viability of animals and plants 18 [BernasconiOsterwalder et al., 2012, pp. 319, 322-325] . In addition, the Agree ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the WTO expand the list of such measures to precautionary ones. Their applica tion is conditioned by international custom and practice, and therefore is often hidden and looks like the imposition of administrative barriers. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture contain a special safe guards for agricultural imports. The former also contains the category of nonactionable subsidies (Article 8), 19 including the financing of "green" technologies and innovations. "Green economy" measures promoting the development of a lowcarbon economy and stimulating sustainable management in agriculture and forestry are becoming more complicated each year. This includes the transition from controversial countervailing du ties and salvage fees to WTOapproved "green" public procurement [WTO, 2011] and vol untary quality standards. It also includes the formation of an "environmentally friendly goods" category attributable to a new marketoriented type of regulation [UNEP, IISD, 2014, pp. 13-4] . According to UNCTAD, over a third of global imports are subject to a variety of technical barriers -from inspection requirements to assessments of safety and quality parameters. Every sixth product must meet sanitary standards [UNCTAD, 2013, p. 3-5] . Moreover, these standards are increasingly confirming their protective assign ment, while developed highincome countries hide selective protectionism behind tech nical barriers (they regulate access to 65% of imported goods, which is half as much as in Africa, and twice as high as in Asia and Latin America).
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The problem of preserving and restoring the resource base is both the national priority of BRICS states and the focus of the BRICS multilateral dialogue since its launch: more than 40% of the world's forests and a third of the world's arable land are located in Bra zil, Russia, India and China. 21 In 2000-2008, more than half of the global increment of government expenditures on forest maintenance was provided by China and India [FAO, 2016, p. 39] . The BRICS forestry sector employs from 147,000 people in South Africa to 3.841 million in China, while the production of industrial wood, paper and pulp, and wood processing provides from 0.8% (Russia) to 1.7% (India) of GDP [FAO, 2014a, pp. 121-28] . At the same time, in agriculture and forestry, which are fully based on the exploitation of natural and climatic resources, such measures are considered for their potential economic and social consequences affecting almost one in four of the world's inhabitants (judging by the general BRICS population).
Agricultural production in the BRICS is a significant source of greenhouse gas emis sions (it accounts for up to 10% of global emissions in carbon dioxide equivalent).
22 Al though the share of emissions from agriculture and forestry in the total amount of anthro 18 See more details at WTO [n.d.a] . 19 See more details at WTO [n.d.b] . 20 Author's estimations based on data in UNCTAD [2013] . 21 Based on data in FAO [2014a] . 22 Based on data from FAOSTAT database [FAO, n.d.] . pogenic emissions is decreasing, due to the emissions generated by the use of synthetic fertilizers in agriculture (with a share of 13%) and fossil fuels in other sectors, greenhouse gas emissions are growing. 23 Total exports of CO2equivalent from China to developed countries decreased from 827 million tons in 2002 -2007 to 229 million tons in 2007 both as a result of decreasing commodity exports growth and its lower resource intensity, but mainly in line with structural changes in the economy (in par ticular, reduced consumption of solid fuels and lower energy intensity of production). Fur ther, seasonal factors and the consequences of global climate change (rising temperature, droughts, natural disasters) have a radical impact on this sector -deforestation occurs at the fastest pace in Brazil which is actively involving tropical forests in agricultural produc tion [FAO, 2016, p. 18] .
In turn, unilateral "green" trade measures are increasingly becoming a tool for seg menting markets or protecting local producers from international competition. The de crease in the ecological intensity of 109 countries ' exports in 1988-2013 was accompanied by an increase in the overall level of tariff load for finished goods , thus re ducing the effects of tariff escalation. The reasons for the solidarity of India and China on "green" trade measures became obvious. They believe that such measures often contradict international trade rules and therefore require equal treatment for similar goods, that they can be used for hidden protectionism, and that they undermine the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of countries at different levels of development [Ares et al., 2009, pp. 13-8] .
For BRICS countries, the likelihood that similar protection measures can be used to hide protectionism within the group is growing (see Fig. 1a ). This includes consistent in troduction of safety and quality standards (Brazil and Russia), technical barriers (Brazil), and price control measures (China) along with a sharp drop in the number of antidump ing investigations and dominance of ecologically intensive raw materials and semifinished products in foreign trade (see Fig. 1b ). China's emissions export volumes are estimated to reach 2,116.4 million tons per year, Russia's -540.7 million tons, India's -319 tons and Brazil's -66.6 tons [Makarov, Sokolova, 2014, p. 494] .
On the one hand, the main items of Russian exports within the BRICS have the highest carbon intensity: oil and petroleum products provide 61% of Russia's exports accounting for more than 58% of all BRICS fuel imports, 24 along with fertilizers and forestry products. Then come oil, mining and metallurgical products supplied by South Africa and organic chem istry exports from India. On the other hand, taking into account the weakness of BRICS export positions on the mutual markets [Khmelevskaya, 2015a] , Russian emissions imports from China have substantially increased over the last decade (from 10% to 38%) [Makarov, Sokolova, 2014, p. 493] . Open BRICS economies have differently experienced the reversal of the global development cycle trajectory in 2013-2016. In Brazil and Russia, there was a recession, in South Africa there was stagnation; China experienced a slowdown, while India continued to grow [IMF, 2018, pp. 2-3] .
Consequently, given the differentiation of the BRICS countries in terms of the qual ity of their growth and sensitivity to external shocks, marketoriented "green economy" regulation is increasingly becoming a way of segmenting markets (of oil and petroleum products in Russia and China) and protecting local producers from international compet ition (for agricultural products from Brazil and Russia). For today's development models in China, India and South Africa, the relationship between economic expansion and carbon dioxide equivalent emissions is already weakly significant in terms of environmental risks and threats, even if their annual increment of 5% to 10% is taken into account [Azevedo et al., 2018, p. 114] . For Brazil and Russia, national development patterns still increase GHG emissions extensively.
The issue of dirty fuels used in transportation, industry and production of environmen tally friendly goods purchased in the framework of social assistance and state population sup port programmes is also relevant. For example, India blocked the entry into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2014 until it received a waiver (provisional exemption) re lated to the rules for creating food stocks, ie., when food is purchased from small producers at inflated prices with its subsequent sale in the local market at a lower price. In turn, China and Russia participate in multilateral negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement based on a list of 54 products 26 compiled by the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation countries and approved at the 2012 Vladivostok summit (including wind turbines, air quality controllers, solar panels and other goods demandable in the local BRICS markets).
Conclusion
The foreign policy contour of the BRICS dialogue on sustainable development is set within the UN system, the WTO, and other international fora based on a shared responsibility and national obligations in the framework of international agreements and multilateral regula tions. As its alignment with development strategies occurs in different environments and at different paces, the convergence of positions both within and outside the BRICS forum is in line with their intraeconomic priorities, and hence multilateral cooperation mechanisms are included in national development plans: the transition of Russia and China to growth based on domestic demand is accompanied by increased participation in crosscutting in frastructure projects and supranational institutions, while overcoming the same structural constraints in Brazil and South Africa is largely based on integration opportunities.
Broader involvement of intraBRICS foreign trade relations in addressing the prob lems of quality development is partly hampered by the absence of free trade agreements, as evidenced by the practice of applying hidden trade measures in the BRICS in 2011-2016. Maintaining relatively similar low tariff loads in raw materials sectors, BRICS countries hinder the turnover of "green" goods within the association through nontariff measurestechnical barriers and price control measures along with a sharp drop in the number of antidumping investigations, and quality standards in conditions of sustainably high turno ver of environmentally intensive raw materials. Crude oil and petroleum products account for 80% of the almost twofold growth of Russian supplies to other BRICS countries (by 80% in 2009-2014) . 27 At the same time, given the differentiation of the BRICS countries in terms of quality of growth and sensitivity to external shocks, if they diversify exports (of oil and petroleum products from Russia and China) or protect local producers from international competi tion (for agricultural products from Brazil and Russia), using "green economy" measures instead of raising tariffs for environmentally friendly goods can help maintain the levels of trade and economic relations. 
